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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-4012 
_____________ 
 
KWAME BOATENG SAKYI, 
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
 
Respondent. 
_____________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A045-161-469) 
Immigration Judge: Andrew Arthur 
_____________ 
 
Argued July 13, 2012 
 
Before: FUENTES, HARDIMAN, and ROTH Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  September 5, 2012) 
 
Robert A. Arhin, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Arhin and Associates 
1003 K Street, N.W., Suite 670 
Washington, DC 20001 
 
Yedidya Cohen, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Jennifer P. Williams, Esq. 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
United States Department of Justice, Civil Division 
P.O. Box 878, Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC 20044 
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_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
Kwame Boateng Sakyi petitions this Court for review of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals’ final order of removal.  We conclude that this case presents a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding Sakyi’s nationality.  Therefore, we will transfer the proceeding for 
a new hearing before a district court pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(B). 
I 
Because we write primarily for the parties, who are well acquainted with the case, 
we recite only the facts essential to our disposition of this petition.  Sakyi was born in 
Ghana in October 1982 and immigrated to the United States as a lawful permanent 
resident in August 1995.  In February 1996, Sakyi’s parents were divorced by decree of 
the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.  In a two-page form order, the Superior 
Court awarded custody of Sakyi to his maternal grandmother in Ghana—apparently on 
the mistaken belief that he was living with her there.  In September 1999, when Sakyi 
was 16 years old, his mother became a naturalized U.S. citizen.  There is no evidence that 
Sakyi’s father has ever naturalized. 
In April 2007, Sakyi pleaded guilty to charges of conspiracy to possess heroin 
with the intent to distribute and was sentenced to 70 months’ imprisonment.  While Sakyi 
was serving his sentence at the Allenwood Federal Correctional Complex in White Deer, 
Pennsylvania, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) initiated removal 
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proceedings against him on the ground that this heroin conviction constituted an 
aggravated felony and a controlled substance violation.  Sakyi contested his removability 
on the basis that he was a U.S. citizen, having derived citizenship through his mother.  To 
prove that he was in his mother’s legal custody at the time of her naturalization, Sakyi 
and his sister gave testimony at a hearing before the Immigration Judge (the “IJ”) and 
Sakyi submitted documentary evidence and affidavits from his mother and his aunt.  DHS 
presented documentary evidence suggesting that Sakyi lived with his nearby aunt at the 
time.  The IJ found that Sakyi had failed to carry his burden of demonstrating by a 
preponderance that his mother had legal custody of him at the time of her naturalization.  
Since Sakyi had not raised any other defenses to removal or applications for relief, the IJ 
ordered Sakyi removed.  The Board of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA”) affirmed on 
September 14, 2011, and Sakyi filed this petition for review.1
II 
 
We have jurisdiction over Sakyi’s petition for review of the BIA’s final order of 
removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  See Papageorgiou v. Gonzalez, 413 F.3d 356, 357 
(3d Cir. 2005) (observing that we have jurisdiction to determine whether the petitioner is 
in fact an alien).  Our review of Sakyi’s citizenship claim is governed by 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b)(5), which provides: 
(A) Court determination if no issue of fact.  If the petitioner claims to be a 
national of the United States and the court of appeals finds from the 
                                              
1 We denied Sakyi’s motion for a stay of removal on December 15, 2011, and Sakyi was 
removed to Ghana on March 14, 2012.  Prior to his removal, Sakyi was detained by DHS 
at the Clinton County Correctional Facility in McElhattan, Pennsylvania, and in the York 
County Prison in York, Pennsylvania. 
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pleadings and affidavits that no genuine issue of material fact about the 
petitioner’s nationality is presented, the court shall decide the nationality 
claim. 
 
(B) Transfer if issue of fact.  If the petitioner claims to be a national of the 
United States and the court of appeals finds that a genuine issue of material 
fact about the petitioner’s nationality is presented, the court shall transfer 
the proceeding to the district court of the United States for the judicial 
district in which the petitioner resides for a new hearing on the nationality 
claim and a decision on that claim as if an action had been brought in the 
district court under section 2201 of Title 28. 
 
(C) Limitation on determination.  The petitioner may have such nationality 
claim decided only as provided in this paragraph. 
 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5) (underlining added). 
Under this section, we must determine whether Sakyi’s citizenship claim presents 
a genuine issue of material fact.  Our standard for making this determination is identical 
to the standard we use for reviewing a district court’s grant of summary judgment.  
Joseph v. Att’y Gen., 421 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2005).  “[A] court of appeals cannot 
refuse to allow a de novo review of a citizenship claim if the evidence presented in 
support of the claim would be sufficient to entitle a litigant to trial were such evidence 
presented in opposition to a motion for summary judgment.”  Id. at 229-30 (quoting 
Agosto v. INS, 436 U.S. 748, 756 (1978)).  “Accordingly, the government, as the party 
seeking what amounts to summary judgment, bears the burden of establishing that no 
genuine issue of material fact exists and that the undisputed facts establish its right to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Id. at 230 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, the 
sole issue before us is whether the Government is entitled to what amounts to summary 
judgment on Sakyi’s derivative citizenship claim. 
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III 
At all times relevant to this case, the statute on derivative citizenship provided that 
“[a] child born outside the United States of alien parents . . . becomes a citizen of the 
United States” upon “[t]he naturalization of the parent having legal custody of the child 
when there has been a legal separation of the parents.”  INA § 321(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a) 
(1995), repealed and superseded by Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-395, 
114 Stat. 1631 (2000).2
The leading case in this Circuit on “legal custody” for the purpose of derivative 
citizenship is Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252.  Under the majority opinion in that case, 
legal custody is resolved in the first instance by a valid judicial determination of custody 
in the specific case.  Id. at 254.  If there is no such determination, legal custody means 
“actual uncontested custody.”  Id.; see also id. at 270 (Nygaard and Rosenn, JJ., 
  Under former INA § 321(a)(3), Sakyi must prove four essential 
facts to establish his U.S. citizenship: (i) that his mother was naturalized after a legal 
separation from his father; (ii) that his mother was naturalized before he turned eighteen; 
(iii) that he was residing in the United States as a legal permanent resident at the time of 
his mother’s naturalization; and (iv) that his mother had legal custody of him at the time 
of her naturalization.  See Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252, 257 (3d Cir. 2005).  The 
government concedes the first three of these facts.  This case therefore turns on whether 
Sakyi was in the legal custody of his mother at the time of her naturalization. 
                                              
2 Former INA § 321(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a), controls this case notwithstanding the Child 
Citizenship Act of 2000 because Sakyi’s mother was naturalized in 1999, before § 321(a) 
was repealed.  See Joseph, 421 F.3d at 230 n.11. 
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concluding therefore that an analysis of state custody law is “unnecessary and irrelevant” 
in the absence of a valid custody decree). 
A 
We first consider, as a matter of law, whether the D.C. divorce decree purporting 
to award custody of Sakyi to his grandmother in Ghana was a valid judicial determination 
of custody.  The IJ determined that the D.C. Superior Court lacked authority under Bagot 
to enter the custody award in this case, and the BIA assumed the same.  Before this 
Court, however, the Government argues that the D.C. Superior Court’s divorce decree is 
valid and that, therefore, Sakyi’s grandmother, not his mother, had legal custody of him 
at the relevant time.  We disagree. 
The Government contends that that Court could have exercised subject-matter 
jurisdiction to determine custody if (1) Sakyi was living in D.C. at the time of the 
commencement of his parents’ divorce proceedings, or (2) Sakyi and at least one parent 
had a significant connection with the District of Columbia and there was substantial 
evidence available in the District concerning his future care, protection, training, and 
personal relationships.  See D.C. Code § 16-4503(a)(1)-(2) (1981) (repealed 2001). 
We conclude, however, that the D.C. Superior Court lacked authority to invoke 
jurisdiction on grounds of residency or “significant connection” given that it believed that 
Sakyi was residing in Ghana and the court made no findings of fact as to the 
appropriateness of the forum to determine custody.  Cf. Bagot, 398 F.3d at 264-65.  In 
addition, D.C. law did not authorize the Superior Court to award custody to a non-party 
in divorce proceedings.  See T.S. v. M.C.S., 747 A.2d 159, 163 (D.C. 2000) (holding that 
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“the divorce statutes do not authorize the trial judge to award custody of the children to 
their grandmother, especially where the grandmother has not consented”); see also W.D. 
v. C.S.M., 906 A.2d 317, 321 (D.C. 2006) (reaffirming that the D.C. divorce statutes 
contemplate an award of custody only between parents). 
B 
Because the D.C. Superior Court’s custody award was invalid, we must consider 
whether Sakyi’s mother could have had actual uncontested custody of him at the time that 
she naturalized.  As the Government candidly concedes, any inquiry into actual 
uncontested custody in this case “raises a material question of fact because there is 
conflicting evidence in the record.”  (Respondent’s Br. at 33).  Sakyi has introduced 
testimony and affidavits that he was in his mother’s custody at the time of her 
naturalization.  In addition, while other evidence suggests that he may have resided 
instead with his aunt, that is not necessarily inconsistent with his mother having “actual 
uncontested custody” of him. 
Because this issue presents a genuine issues of material fact, we will transfer this 
proceeding to “the district court of the United States for the judicial district in which the 
petitioner resides for a new hearing on the nationality claim and a decision on that claim 
as if an action had been brought in the district court [for a declaratory judgment] under 
section 2201 of Title 28.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(B).  Although, since his removal, Sakyi 
no longer resides in any United States judicial district, all of his places of incarceration 
and detention during the removal proceedings in this case were located in the Middle 
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District of Pennsylvania.  Both parties therefore agree that that district is the proper venue 
of any transfer under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(B), and we also agree. 
IV 
Accordingly, we will vacate the order of the BIA and transfer the proceeding to 
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania for a de novo 
hearing and declaratory judgment on Sakyi’s nationality claim.  Should this matter be 
returned to this Court, it shall be assigned to this Panel for disposition on the merits. 
